“Terror, Territory, and Deterritorialization: Landscapes of
Terror and the Unmaking of State Power in the Mozambican ‘Civil’ War” by Lunstrum, Elizabeth
Terror, Territory, and Deterritorialization:
Landscapes of Terror and the unmaking of State
Power in the Mozambican "Civil" War
Elizabeth Lunstrum
DEartment of Geograplry andYorkCennefvr Intetnational and,Seauity Sa,t&ies,YarkUniuersity
During the Mozambican "civil" war, residents across large areas of the countryside were terrorized out of their
villages by the South Afiican-backed Mozambican rebel organization Renamo. Drawing on the deterritorialization
debates and investigations into the relation between territory and terror-literatures that have rarely engaged
with one il1q1trs1-xnd bringing them together with interviews with survivors of the conflict, I show how Renamo
unmade state power through a terror-induced deterritorialization. As the newly independent Mozambican state
had attempted to build a new nation-state through communal villages as a particular ordering of space, Renamo
used tactics of profound terror to destroy the lived spaces of these villages to empty them of residents but also of
citizen and state. Speaking to a gap in the deterritorialization debates, this case illustrates that terror is a powerful
force in realizing deterritorialization. Yet these debates, in particular their insights conceming rhe necessary
relation between de- and reterritorialization, help clarift that terror is more accurately linked to territorialization
processes rather than tenitory simply as space. This is a valuable addition to the literature on territory and terror
and key to understanding Renamo's achievements. The de/reterritorialization coupling furthermore sheds light
on the equally spatial and temporal aspects of terror and, more concretely, helps clarifir why Renamo's terror
stands out as particularly disturbing. Namely, Renamo effected a suspended state of deterritorialization; although
it did rebuild spaces and spatial relations, this reterritorialization was ultimately aimed ar social, political, and
spatial annihilation and hence at ensuring the villages remain indefinitely empry. Key'Words: detenitorialiTation,
MoTanbt4ue, tenitory, terror, war.
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Durante la guerra "civil" de Mozambique, los aterrorizados residentes de vastas 6reas rurales fueron expulsados
de sus aldeas por la organizaci6n mozambicana rebelde denominada Renamo, con apoyo sudafricano. Con datos
extraidos de los debates sobre desterritorializaci6n e investigaciones en el dmbito de la relaci6n entre territorio y
terror-literaturas que raramente se han involucrado la una con la orra-e integr6ndolas por medio de entrevistas
practicadas a sobrevivientes del conflicto, muestro c6mo Renamo deshizo el poder estatal por desterritorializaci6n
inducida por el terror. Mientras el nuevo estado independiente de Mozambique habia intentado conrruir una
nueva naci6n-estado a partir de aldeas comunales, como una particular organizaci6n del espacio, Renamo utiliz6
tdcticas de profundo terror para destruir los espacios vitales de estas aldeas, desocupdndolas de residentes y tambi6n
de ciudadanos y estado. Hablando de una brecha en los debates sobre desterritorializaci6n, el presente caso deja
ver que el terror es una fuerza poderosa para causar la desterritorializaci6n. Sin embargo, estos debates, en especial
las observaciones en lo que concieme a la necesaria relaci6n entre des-y reterritorializaci6n, ayudan a aclarar que
el terror estd m6s claramente relacionado con los procesos de territorializaci6n que con el territorio considerado
simplemente como espacio. Esta es una valiosa adici6n a la literatura sobre territorio y terror, y clave para entender
los logros de Renamo. Todavia mds, el acoplamiento desterritorializaci6n/reterritorializaci6n arroja luces sobre los
igualmente importantes aspectos espaciales y temporales del terror y, m6s en concreto, ayuda a aclarar por qu6 el
terror de Renamo se destaca como particularmente perturbador. Es decir, Renamo efectu6 un estado suspendido
de desterritorializaci6n; aunque de hecho reconstruy6 espacios y relaciones espaciales, la reterritorializaci6n ino-
portunamente apuntaba hacia la aniquilaci6n social, politica y espacial, y por ende a asegurar que las aldeas per-
manecieran desiertas de manera indefinida. Palabras claqre: destenitmializori6n,MoTanbiEte, tenitario, ter"rar, guerra
s I sat down with several women from the
village of Canhane, Eliasse began to explain
how the violence and brutalitv unleashed bv
Renamo troops during the Mozambican "civil" war had
left Canhane entirely abandoned. I then asked, rather
naively, if they had ever talked with the Renamo
soldiers. Eliasse's friend No6mia replied in a heavy tone,
"How would we have done that?. . . Facing them made
you tum pale; if you were to face them, you would lose
your breath" (Canhane 30 September2004).lf any sin-
gle word could capture this emotion, surely it was terror.
From the mid-1980s until 1992, residents across large
areas of Mozambique had, like Eliasse and No6mia,
been terrorized out of their villages by the South
African-backed Mozambican rebel organization named
Renamo, short for Resist€ncia Nacional Mogambicana.
Such terror tells us much about the relation between
terror and territory and in particular the ways in
which terror is deployed to unmake and remake space.
Bringing the experiences of survivors of the conflict in
Canhane and its neighbor Massingir Velho (Freure 1)
together with two literatures that have rarely engaged
with one another-the deterritorialization debates
and investigations into the relation between territory
and terror-I show how Renamo unmade state power
across large areas of rural Mozambique through a
terror-induced deterritorialization. As the newly inde-
pendent Mozambican state attempted to build a new
nation-state through communal villages, these became
one of Renamo's prime targets as it worked to dissolve
state power. Employing tactics of profound terror, the
rebel organization destroyed the lived spaces of these
villages to empty them of residents but also of citizen
and state. This case speaks to a general gap in the
deterritorialization literature by illustrating that terror
is a powerful force in realizing deterritorialization. Yet
more than this, recognition of the necessary relation
berween de- and reterritorialization emerging from the
deterritorialization debates makes clear that terror is
more accurately linked to territorialization processes
rather than territory simply understood as space.
This contributes to our understanding of the relation
between territory and terror and, more concretely,
Renamo's achievements. This de/reterritorialization
coupling also helps clarifii what is unique, and uniquely
disturbing, about Renamo's brand of terror-induced
deterritorialization and sheds light on the equally
spatial and temporal aspects of terror. Namely, Renamo
effected what I refer to as a suspended state of
deterritorialization. The rebel organization did reter-
ritorialize the landscape; yet this remaking of space
was ironically aimed at social, political, and spatial
annihilation and hence at ensuring the villages remain
indefinitely empty.
Before tuming to the scholarly debates and the con-
crete ways in which Renamo's terror unmade terri-
tory, a note of caution is in order. Given that the
conflict played out within southem Africa along with
the often invisible nature of apartheid South Africa's
support for Renamo, there is a danger of this con-
flict being read as "yet another" example of "African,"
"tribal," or "ethnic" "black-on-black" violence. Such
commonly held assumptions are peppered with varying
degrees of historical amnesia and geographical near-
sightedness. I ask readers to keep in mind that the
causes of Mozambique's civil war transgressed the coun-
try's borders, as the conflict was actively promoted by
the apartheid South African state, a point I retum to
later.
Territory, Deterritorialization, and Terror
Although the concept of territory remains underthe-
orized, it received a theoretical boost in the form of
critical rejections of the deterritorialized- or globalized-
world thesis. In the early 1990s, a handful of scholars
and pundits began announcing that forces of globaliza-
tion were eroding the power of the nation-state and in
some cases bringing about the end of territory. Glob-
allzing phenomena-such as migrating capital, bodies,
and information-were apparently becoming detached
from territory and territorial boundaries and creating
a type of deterritorialized world in which territory was
losing its significance (Ohmae 1995; Appadurai 1996).
Many geographers and their spatially minded colleagues
shotback, demonstrating that such alarmist predictions
rested on theoretically and empirically weak under-
standings of state power, scale, and territory (Bren-
ner 2004; Sparke 2005). In the process of laying out
their criticisms, they had provided far more sophis-
ticated theorizations of these concepts. Arguably the
most important insight emerging from their critiques
is that deterritorialization is never the endgame; it is
Figure 1. Mozambique's Massingir
District.
always coupled with a retenitorializarion, whether this is
led by nongovemmental actors like corporations, supra-
or substate actors, or the national state. Territory hence
does not cease to be as deterritorialization (or glob-
alization) takes place; it instead becomes something
different as it is physically reconfigured or, in a word,
reterritorialized. O Tuathail (1999) pushes this idea fur-
ther in his insistence that "It is not simply that there
is no de-territorialisation without re-territorialisation,
but that both are parts ofongoing generalized processes
of territorialization" (I43).
Such insights have import well beyond the
globalized-world debates. First, they draw attention to
the dynamic and shifting as opposed to static nature of
territory. It is not just that territory is "an effect of the
practices that constitute it as such" (Wainwright 2008,
21), although it certainly is this. These contributions
show, whether they explicitly assert this or not, that ter-
ritory is actively and routinely made, unmade, and made
again. Furthermore, they reinforce that what is often im-
portant in understanding the power of territory in shap-
ing lives is not territory itself, understood merely as a
container or inert space; rather, it is the processes of ter-
ritorialization or the processes through which territory
is fashioned, undone, reshaped, rescaled, rebound, and
so on (Newman 2006). Equally significant, the empha-
sis on reterritorialization shows us that power relations
are never erased in the process of deterritorialization.
Rather, they are altered and reinscribed on the land-
scape, producing new markets, scales, identities, and
forms of govemance, as well as novel configurations of
power and territory (Brenner 2004; Sparke 2005).
If the deterritorialization debates have expanded our
understanding of territory, they have generally over-
looked the ways in which violence and terror territo-
rialize and thereby reshape territory. A separate debate
has, however, begun to examine the relation between
territory, on the one hand, and violence and terror, on
the other. Scholars like Connollv (1996) and Hindess
( 2006) have, for instance, drawn attention to the similar
erymological roots of territory and terror, leading Con-
nolly (1996) to contend that "To occupy a territory is
to receive sustenance and to exercise violence. Teni-
tory is land occupied by violence" (I44). More recent
scholarship has focused on the territorial and spatial as-
pects of the "War on Tenor." Those debates currently
receiving the most attention consider whether or the
ways in which the defining spaces of the 'W'ar on Terror,
such as the U.S. Naval Station at Guantdnamo Bay, are
accurately characterized as Agambenian "spaces of ex-
ception" or legally ambiguous spaces or territories where
the law is suspended and where state-orchestrated vio-
lence, including torture, plays out with impuniry (e.g.,
Butler 2004; Gregory 2006; Comaroff 2007).
There has nonetheless been surprisingly little ex-
plicit engagement in these discussions with the deter-
ritorialization debates or their central concepts, with
a few notable exceptions. Elden (2007), for one, has
critiqued claims that Al-Qaeda is a "deterritorialized"
threat or a "network of networks" detached from or un-
confined to any nation-state, showing there is a definite
territorial basis to its coherence and operations. More
useful, though, in broadening our understanding of the
intricate links among territory, territorialization, and
terror are several recent studies that take us beyond
the frontlines of the War on Terror. Although not
employing the language of deterritorialization, Tyner
(2008) shows how the Khmer Rouge unmade the space
of Cambodia-that is, deterritorialized it-to remake
the country economically, socially, and spatially into
a communist utopia where all vestiges of a colonial,
capitalist past had been wiped clean. In addition to
seemingly more benign practices like the rationaliza-
tion of agriculture, this unmaking and remaking of space
pivoted on symbolically charged, excessively grotesque
executions aimed at purging seemingly dangerous, un-
committed, or otherwise unwanted populations and
hence "purifying space" so as to remake it. More than
mere killings, these executions terrorized or frightened
onlookers into submission. Tyner's evidence suggests
that such acts of terror were conducive to the Khmer
Rouge's territorialization of Cambodia given that on-
lookers were less likely to interfere with and indeed
were compelled to assist with the spatial undoing and
reconstitution of the country.
Equally instructive is Oslender's (2007) investiga-
tion into how paramilitary groups sponsored by the
Colombian state and Revolutionary Forces of Columbia
(FARC) rebels have used violent threats, buming vil-
lages, bombings, and massacres to deterritorialize vil-
lages of Afro-Colombian communities in the country's
Pacific Coast region. More specifically, these acts of ter-
ror destroy or deterritorialize the lived and "everyday"
spaces of the communities, terrorizing residents into
fleeing and severing links between residents and their
homes, land, and other resources. Such forced displace-
ment is motivated by the desires of the paramilitary
groups and FARC rebels to remove from the communi-
ties possible support for their opposition and to en-
able unfettered access to land and natural resources
once controlled by the now-displaced communities.
Oslender is less explicit about reterritorialization, yet
his analysis shows that this materializes in the form
of both outsiders' consolidation of power over land
and resources and networks of resistance spearheaded
by displaced communities and their supporters. Both
Oslender and Tyner are explicitly concemed with how
violence and terror unmake or remake space, reflecting
the dynamic understanding of territory that underpins
rejections of the deterritorialized-world thesis. Yet they
take one step further by showing several ways in which
violence and terror transform territory. Building on and
departing from these insights, I tum to examine the
ways in which Renamo's terror deterritorialized com-
munal villages as a means of dissolving state power,
leaving these villages uninhabited and indefinitely
uninhabitable.
Building a New Nation and State through
Villagization
To understand how it was that Renamo's terror effec-
tively deterritorialized rural villages, we first must take
a step back to look at Frelimo's attempt to build a new
nation-state. Upon independence in 1975, Frente de
LibertaEso de Mogambique (Frelimo) came to power as
the single-party head of the socialist state. Frelimo had
inherited from the Portuguese a citizenry that was poor,
overwhelmingly illiterate, and often physically difficult
to reach and hence govem. The party additionally faced
a nation only in the loosest sense of the term, as it
lacked a common sense of identity, history, and even a
common language. Frelimo in response set out to un-
dertake a large-scale villagization project in which rural
residents would be collected from their scattered dis-
tribution across the countryside and concentrated into
rationally organized communal villages (lsaacman and
Isaacman 1983; Newitt L995). These would not only
assist Frelimo in providing social services but also pro-
vide a space in which seemingly backward, "traditional"
practices could be purged; national history taught; a
sense of national unity forged; and modem, national
subjects created. In short, it was through the commu-
nal villages that a modem, revolutionary, and unified
nation was to be bom (Lunstrum 2007).
The communal villages were also a vehicle of state
formation. First, they enabled social control because
it was easier to watch over and govem new national
subjects if they lived near one another. The social and
agricultural services enabled by the communal villages,
farms, and trading networks, moreover, created a cap-
illary system of patronage with nodal points in each
village. In exchange for these services, Frelimo in the-
ory would receive support and legitimacy from village
residents. By repeating this pattem across the coun-
try, Frelimo could consolidate its power nationally as
its patronage and influence would both span and unite
the country (Lunstrum 2007).This new spatialiry of
village life in theory enabled the rise of a new nation
and state under the guidance of Frelimo and amounted
to Frelimo's attempt to territorialize the newly inde-
pendent national landscape. Although the communal
villages did not unfold exactly as planned due in part to
varying degrees of peasant opposition, their implemen-
tation did reshape much of the countryside, including
Canhane and Massingir Velho, whose residents were
relocated into the new villages in the late 1970s.1
Renamo's Deterritorializing Tactics :
Linking Terror, Territory, and State
(Jnmaking
Although residents of the two villages were mostly
supportive of Frelimo's vision of development, as was
much of Gaza Province in the south of the coun-
try, resistance and resentment were swelling elsewhere,
especially in areas of the center and north. Many res-
idents there found Frelimo's reshaping of the coun.
tryside offensive, including the party's anti-"tradition"
stance, its apparent commitment to developing Frelimo
strongholds at the expense ofdre rest ofthe country, and
especially villagization, which had grown progressively
coercive and increasingly backed by state violence
(Geffray and Pedersen 1986). Organizing around these
grievances, a small number of Mozambicans united
under the name Renamo. Yet from its earliest days,
the group was actively shaped and encouraged by out-
siders. After early support from southem Rhodesian and
Portuguese agitators, Renamo became fiercely yet in-
creasingly clandestinely backed by the anticommunist
apartheid South African state, which was more than
eager to train and support Renamo given the threat
posed by a black-led, antiapartheid, and decidedly so-
cialist Frelimo. Giv'en the larger context of the Cold
War, nominally anticommunist Renamo also received
assistance from conservative factions in Portugal, the
United States, and West Germany.
Generously supported, Renamo troops set out on a
mission to destabilize Mozambique to bring down Fre-
limo and erase its imprint from the countryside. By
the end of the war in 1992, there were 1 million ca-
sualties along with 5.5 million displaced civilians-
over one third of the national population-who sought
protection in the bush, larger villages and towns, and
neighboring countries (Lunstrum 2007; United States
Agency for Intemational Development 2009). A1-
though Frelimo troops were partly responsible, much
of the violence throughout the country was directly at.
tributable to Renamo insurgency and the actions of its
20,000 troops. Although it committed atrocities coun-
trywide, Renamo reserved its most brutal acts for the
south, where support for Frelimo was strongest, and
where it was not possible simply to "pick off a hand-
ful of local party officials" (Hall 1990,53).
Renamo's was a particular type of destabilization,
indeed a deterritorialization, as it worked to undo
Frelimo's power specifically by unraveling its territorial
reordering of the countryside. Because it was through
the communal villages that Frelimo had constituted
space as state territory and individuals as state subjects,
it was these spaces that required erasure. Renamo
effected this erasure primarily through tactics of terror
directed at once against the state, the peasantry, and the
very structure of the communal villages. Renamo not
only unmade the communal villages as spaces of daily
life, similar to what we see in Oslender's analysis; it un-
made these lived spaces in their concurrent role as state
spaces.-
Within the communal villages, for example, Ren-
amo routinely attacked local Frelimo party offices and
the social services provided by the state (Vines 1991;
Newitt 1995), thus denying Frelimo one of its most
important sources of power, given that Frelimo gained
legitimacy and patronage by providing these services. A
hallmark of Renamo's tactics, its troops also performed
acts of bodily mutilation that were often aimed at mock-
ing Frelimo's power and presence in the villages. For
example, drawing attention to Renamo's penchant for
disfiguring and mutilating faces, Josud elaborated,
Sometimes Renamo's men would cut out people's mouths
and noses. \Uhen they cut your mouth out, your teeth
would be exposed, which looked like you were laughing.
So they used to say that you were laughing at the President.
(Massingir Velho 1 February 2005)
While the mutilated body stood as a grotesque mockery
of the President, the brutality of the act was at the
same time a reminder of Frelimo's inabilicy to protect
citizens, let alone its supporters, and a reminder of just
how dangerous Frelimo's national tenitory had become.
Yet what made Renamo's violence utterly terrorizing
was that its tactics were often not aimed at (overt) signs
of Frelimo or Frelimo supporters. Here is where much
of its power to deterritorialize by terrorizing lay, as resi-
dents were terrorized out of the lived spaces and indeed
the most intimate spaces of the communal villages, in-
cluding their homes. Because Frelimo had radically re-
structured even the most personal spaces of community
and family life through villagization, an attack on or
within these spaces was simultaneously an attack on
Frelimo and its attempt to modernize the countryside
and peasantry. As such, Renamo soldiers actively and
violently destroyed the material conditions necessary
for social life and even basic existence within the vil-
lages. They systematically looted homes and stole live-
stock, desffoyed household goods and crops and, before
they moved on, set fire to houses and fields. As ex-
plained by Luciano, Renamo troops, "even bumed the
maize [in our fields] so that when the people thought
about this, they would become discouraged and would
prefer to stay where they were" (Canhane 28 September
2004).
Although the timing and targets of Renamo's vi-
olence were often unpredictable, one feature of the
group's terror tactics that was predictable was that they
were performed as spectacle, in many ways similar to
the tactics used to unmake space in Cambodia and
Colombia as highlighted by Oslender (2007 ) and Tyner
(2008). In forcing people to witness the attacks or their
aftermaths and as accounts of these atrocities spread,
Renamo successfully transformed the villages into land-
scapes of tenor and insecurity that residents were forced
to abandon. For example, victims were often mutilated,
having their ears, mouths, and noses cut out, and preg-
nant women were tom open because Renamo soldiers
"wanted to know the sex of the baby" (multiple in-
terviews, Massingir Velho and Canhane August 2004-
February 2005). This violence, along with castrations
and the killing of children, directly removed future sup-
port for Frelimo but also did so indirectly, as these acts
terrorized survivors and witnesses into fleeing the vil-
lages. Similarly, bodies were placed on display to further
terrorize populations. As Leandro recounted, "Once we
were running away and Renamo soldiers killed a person
and then buried him like a post" (Massingir Velho 1
February 2005). Understanding the spectacular nature
of Renamo's violence also helps explain the fact that
despite the fear these tactics generated, they were not
altogether common. The numbers, depending on who
is asked, range from three to thirteen deaths in Massin-
gir Velho and four to five in Canhane.3 Herein lies the
"genius" of Renamo. \Mhat its troops accomplished was
to terrorize and empty entire villages and entire areas
of the country by unleashing violence that was strategi-
cally random, witnessed, and, above all, highly stylized
and sadistically cruel. Wielding such terror, Renamo
had degraded national territory into chaotic and unpre-
dictable space, reduced citizens to refugees or intemally
displaced persons, and ultimately dissolved state power.
In so doing, Renamo had fulfilled its mission of undoing
Frelimo's territorializing of a new Mozambique. To be
sure, this was a pattem reproduced throughout southem
Mozambique. In fact, in Gaza Province's Massingir Dis-
trict (Figure 1), home to both Canhane and Massingir
Velho, Renamo's terror emptied over 90 percent of the
district's twenty-one villages (Diriba, Leonhardt, and
Cooke 1995).
This analysis differs from those of Oslender (2007)
and Tyner (2008) in its focus on the ways in which Ren-
amo worked to destroy the lived spaces of the communal
villages as state spaces. There are nonetheless important
parallels. First, the focus on the unmaking of space re-
flects a dynamic understanding of territory and the ways
in which violence and terror do not merely play out in or
occupy territory, as suggested by scholars like Connolly,
but fundamentally transform it. In other words, violence
and terror territorialize. Second, the terror-induced de-
territorializations of Mozambique, Colombia, and Cam-
bodia also reinforce what terror isr It amounts to acts of
extreme and often symbolically charged violence used
not necessarily to wipe out populations physically, as
with genocide as strictly understood, but rather to scare
its victims into compliance-for example, compliance
in providing political endorsement, as in Cambodia,
and compliance in vacating space and refusing political
support for a particular political group, as in Mozam-
bique and Colombia. These cases illustrate that terror,
along with its spatial expressions and transformations, is
above all a technology of govemance (cf. Miller 2006),
not merely a technology of destruction. Furthermore,
given that acts of terror in all three contexts were di-
rected primarily at civilians, they amount to unmistak-
able acts of terrorism, reminding us that the unmaking
of space is a potent weapon in terrorism's arsenal.
Terror, Territory, and Renamots
Suspended State of Deterritorialization
Ending the analysis here, however, would overlook
why residents not only abandoned their villages as Re-
namo's violence unfolded but why they stayed away
until after the conflict ended in 1992.In fact, residents
of Massingir Velho did not retum to the village proper
until several years later because they were "still afraid
of the enemies, even though they didn't kill anymore"
(Massingir Velho 2 February 2005). Unlike other ex-
amples of terror-induced deterritorialization, especially
the Khmer Rouge's unmaking of Cambodia, which was
aimed at rebuilding a new country and people, Ren-
amo worked to ensure that its unmaking of space en-
dured and that the villages stayed empty indefinitely.
This was in effect a suspenled state of deterritarialization.
To grasp this and reflecting the insights of the deterri-
torialization debates, it is important to recognize that
Renamo dld indeed reterritorialize the landscape. With
help from apartheid South Africa and others, Renamo
built networks that crossed intemational borders and
circulated money, supplies, weapons, reconnaissance,
and other forms of knowledge. For instance, it devel-
oped a vast radio network that linked its bases with one
another, with its headquarters in Gorongoza in central
Mozambique, and with the communications exchange
in Phalaborwa, South Africa. As a way of financing fur-
ther attacks, moreover, Renamo developed networks to
sell goods looted from the communal villages, illegally
captured ivory, and so forth (Vines 1991). Also moving
through these networks were soldiers and porters, many
of whom had been kidnapped during Renamo raids. As
Madalena recalled, Renamo soldiers found her brother
working on his farm.
They cut the sugarcane and gave it to my brother to carry.
After a while, he asked to take a break. . . . They kllled him
to give hlm hls last break. (Massingir Velho 5 February
2005)
In addition to underscoring Renamo's brutal-
ity, Madalena's description shows how Renamo
reconstituted spatial relations and landscapes through
its network of soldiers and porters and the labor they
provided. It was ultimately networks like these that al-
lowed Renamo to expand its operations and to cohere to
undo Frelimo's spatial ordering and its own network of
power.
This, however, proved to be a peculiar type of reter-
ritorialization. For much of the war in the south, Re-
namo's tactics were aimed primarily at continuing the
spatial destruction or ensuring that the communal vil-
lages remain empty. As with other reterritorializations,
new markets, identities, and systems of govemance
emerged. One fundamental difference, though, lies in
the fact that in villages like Massingir Velho and Can-
hane, reterritorializations were always secondary to the
primary goal of spatial destruction; that is, of keep-
ing these communal villages and Frelimo's power de-
territorialized. This was a spatial unmaking in which
Renamo worked to keep these spaces of the former
communal villages empty, save for the weapons, sol-
diers, and so on, which periodically flowed through
them. Renamo also left these villages empty of per-
manent settlement by its troops and supporters and
of the possibility of constructing a new society under
its direction.a This is illustrated by Josu6's poignant
observation, which also highlights the importance of
cattle as a vital source of food, agricultural labor, cul-
tural capital, and economic security: "Renamo's actions
astonished me; how would they govern those people
whose cattle they had stolen?" AsJosu6 was well aware,
Renamo never was interested in goveming populations
or even resources in much of the south beyond doing
so as a means of social, economic, political, and spatial
annihilation.
In other words, for most of the war in provinces
like Gaza, neither Renamo nor apartheid South
Africa worked to reterritorialize so as to create in any
positive sense a state, nation, or territory or even a
market or sense of community conducive to any type
of long-term interest. In rendering the communal
villages indefinitely homeless and stateless and keeping
them empty of all people and activities-except for
those bent on destruction-Renamo brought about
a rype of reterritorialization as deterritorialization
or spatial fixiry as unfixity. Highlighting both the
spatial and temporal underpinnings of tenor, this
was a condition of suspended deterritorialization
in which terror endured. Retuming to the broader
scholarly concems, critics of the globalized-world thesis
help clarifr terror's aptitude for unmaking space by
helping us understand that even the most destructive
deterritorialization is coupled with a necessary reter-
ritorialization. The Mozambican conflict, however,
provides a profoundly disturbing relationship between
the making and unmaking of territory-one effected
through terror in which the reterritorialization refuses
to move beyond the logic and ambition of spatial
destruction.
To conclude, Connolly may be correct in his esti-
mation that "Territory is land occupied by violence."
In fact, Frelimo's implementation of the communal
villages was sometimes backed by state violence, and
certainly so were many of Portugal's prior colonial ter-
ritorial configurations (see, for example, Isaacman and
Isaacman 1983 ; NewitrI995).Yet bringing together the
insights of the critics of the globalized.world thesis and
recent investigations into the links between territory
and terror, the conflict in Mozambique demonstrates
that if violence and terror underlie territory, so too do
they unmake territory. In the Mozambican case, Ren-
amo employed tactics of terror to dissolve a particular
type of territory-state territory-through the destruc-
tion of the lived spaces of the communal villages. More
broadly, though, it is not territory merely as a space that
is associated with terror. Rather, it is this along with the
practices through which territory is crafted, destroyed
or undone, and ultimately built again; that is, it is the
process of territorialization. Simply put, tenor does not
just occupy space, it radically transforms it, unmaking it
and making it anew and into something tenif ing. And,
as I have attempted to illustrate, through Renamo's de-
struction of communal villages like Massingir Velho
and Canhane, the connection between terror and ter'
ritorialization proves particularly intimate in states of
suspended deterritorialization, that is, when the goal
of the territorialization is precisely to unmake territory
and ensure that this spatial unmaking persists.
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Notes
1. The re-creation of Massingir Velho and Canhane into
communal villages was made more urgent by the com-
pletion of the Massingir Dam in the late 1970s, whlch
eventually would flood the two villages, requiring their
relocation.
2. To comprehend this spatial undoing, it is helpful to have
at least 4 rough understanding of what I mean by state
territory: I see it as the space claimed and controlled
(largely) by the state apparatus and claimed or occupied(largely) by or in the name of the nation or citizens,
including the arrangements and agreements through
which the space is calculated, organized, bounded, regu-
lated, and transformed.
3. Although exact figures are diffrcult ro attain, each vil.
lage had approximately 800 to 1,000 residents in my
estimation.
4. In areas of the country where Renamo had more support,
it was able to develop systems of governance less bent on
destruction and aimed at goveming in a more positive
sense (see, for example, Geffray and Pedersen 1986).
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